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MINI-FLASH CRASHES, MODEL RISK, AND OPTIMAL
EXECUTION
ERHAN BAYRAKTAR AND ALEXANDER MUNK
Abstract. Oft-cited causes of mini-flash crashes include human errors, endogenous
feedback loops, the nature of modern liquidity provision. We develop a mathematical
model which captures aspects of these explanations. Empirical features of recent
mini-flash crashes are present in our framework. For example, there are periods
when no such events will occur. If they do, even just before their onset, market
participants may not know with certainty that a disruption will unfold. Our mini-
flash crashes can materialize in both low and high trading volume environments and
may be accompanied by a partial synchronization in order submission.
Instead of adopting a classically-inspired equilibrium approach, we borrow ideas
from the optimal execution literature. Each of our agents begins with beliefs about
how his own trades impact prices and how prices would move in his absence. They,
along with other market participants, then submit orders which are executed at a
common venue. Naturally, this leads us to explicitly distinguish between how prices
actually evolve and our agents’ opinions. In particular, every agent’s beliefs will be
expressly incorrect.
1. Overview
Amidst the violent market disruption on May 6, 2010, the infamous Flash Crash,
“Over 20,000 trades across more than 300 securities were executed at
prices more than 60% away from their values just moments before. More-
over, many of these trades were executed at prices of a penny or less, or
as high as $100,000, before prices of those securities returned to their
‘pre-crash’ levels” ([2]).
Today, this particular event remains so memorable due to its remarkable scale.
In fact, lesser versions of the Flash Crash, or mini-flash crashes, happen quite often.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there may be over a dozen every day ([22]). A rigorous
empirical analysis uncovered “18,520 crashes and spikes with durations less than 1,500
ms” in stock prices from 2006 through 2011 ([31]). The exhaustive documentation on
Nanex LLC’s “NxResearch” site offers further corroboration as well ([4]).
Why do such phenomena occur? Several answers have been proposed. Roughly,
most point to human errors, endogenous feedback loops, the nature of modern liquidity
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provision. These ideas can be viewed as different ways to rationalize how an extreme
(local or global) dislocation in supply and demand can arise in modern markets. Our
contribution is the development of a model which captures this. Our model also appears
to exhibit features of historical mini-flash crashes. For instance, there are periods in
which extreme price moves will not manifest. If they do, accompanying trade volumes
can be high or low. Some market participants may partially synchronize their trading
during a mini-flash crash. Our agents may not know that a mini-flash crash is about to
begin even just before its onset.
Our results seem to be aligned with intuitive expectations as well. For example, our
mini-flash crashes can begin if some of our agents are too uncertain about their initial
beliefs, inaccurate in their understanding of price dynamics, slow to update their models
and objectives, or willing to take on risk.
We construct our model beginning with a finite population of agents trading in a
single risky asset, each of whom must decide how to act based upon his own preferences,
beliefs, and observations. Our specifications are drawn from ideas in the price impact
and optimal execution literature and are given in Sections 3.1 - 3.2.
We imagine that our agents’ orders are submitted to a single venue, where they are ex-
ecuted together with trades from other (unmodeled) market participants. This naturally
compels us to make an explicit distinction between how the risky asset price actually
evolves and our agents’ beliefs about its future evolution (see Section 3.3).
Since we view our agents as simultaneously solving their own optimal execution prob-
lems, we avoid certain strong assumptions that would have been implicitly needed, if we
had used a classical equilibrium-based approach. We use a similar framework to [12, 15]
in that our players’ interaction with the rest of the world (in addition to each other) is
given by a price impact model. An additional consequence is that we precisely describe
the errors in our agents’ beliefs. Potentially, each agent could be wrong both about how
his trades affect prices and how prices would move in his absence.
To the best of our knowledge, this general setup appears to be a new paradigm for
modeling heterogeneous agent systems in the contexts of optimal execution and mini-flash
crashes.
We are ready to begin presenting our work in detail. We highlight key background
material and our paper’s contributions in relation to it in Section 2. Our agents and their
beliefs are described in Section 3. We describe the correct dynamics of the risky asset’s
price in Section 3.3. General analysis of the dynamical system when our agents act as
prescribed by Section 3 but prices actually move as in Section 3.3 are given in Section 4.
Using the material in Section 4, we obtain explicit characterization of mini-flash crashes
when uncertain agents are semi-symmetric in 5. Numerical examples illustrating our
main results are given in Section 6. Our longer proofs are contained in Appendices A -
C.
2. Background & Contributions
In this section, we clarify our contributions and explain how they fit into the current
literature. We already mentioned that existing theories on the causes of mini-flash crashes
could be viewed as falling into one of five categories (see Section 1). Here are further
details.
i) Human errors (and, relatedly, improper risk management) are among the most
commonly cited causes of mini-flash crashes ([29], [35], [5]). The SEC claims
that the majority of mini-flash crashes originate from such sources, in fact ([35]).
When we read about fat finger trades, rogue algorithms, or glitches in the media,
typically human errors are indirectly responsible. For example, due to a bug
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in the systems at the Tokyo Stock Exchange and a typo in a trade submitted
by Mizuho Securities, the share price of the recruitment agency J-Com fell in
minutes from U672,000 to U572,000 on December 8, 2005 ([1]).
ii) Mini-flash crashes may be caused by the rapid, endogenous formation of positive
feedback loops ([3], [31], [23], [29], [28], [30]). As Johnson et al. put it,
“Crowds of agents frequently converge on the same strategy and hence
simultaneously flood the market with the same type of order, thereby
generating the frequent extreme price-change events” ([31]).
A separate empirical study on the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010, specifically,
determined that at its peak, “95% of the trading was due to endogenous triggering
effects” ([23]).
iii) The nature of liquidity provision in modern markets is thought to cause some
mini-flash crashes ([33], [20], [18], [27], [32], [26], [19]). Today, the majority of
liquidity is provided by participants that are free from formal market-making
obligations ([18]). In particular, they can instantly vanish, effectively taking one
or both sides of the order book at some venue with them. A mini-flash crash
can arise either directly as bid-ask spreads blow out or indirectly when a market
order (of any size) tears through a nearly empty collection of limit orders. Such
a phenomenon has been called fleeting liquidity and may have contributed to the
occurrence of 38% of mini-flash crashes from 2006 - 2011 ([27]).
This proposed explanation is deeply intertwined with a crucial empirical ob-
servation: Mini-flash crashes occur in both high and low trading volume regimes.
For instance, the trading volume during the 30s mini-flash crash of “WisdomTree
LargeCap” Growth Fund on November 27, 2012 was nearly eight times the aver-
age daily trading volume for this security ([5]). The empirical study by Florescu
et al. offers extensive evidence that mini-flash crashes often occur during low
trading volume periods as well.
Aspects of (i), (ii), and (iii) are reflected in our work. For example, the human error
theory arises in each of the following ways:
a) Every agent believes that a mini-flash crash is a null event. On the contrary,
there are cases in which one will occur almost surely (see Theorems 5.1 and 5.2).
b) Every agent thinks that his trades affect prices through specific temporary and
permanent price impact coefficients (see Section 3.1). His estimates for these
parameters might be wrong (see Section 3.3).
c) Every agent’s trades may also indirectly impact prices by inducing others to
make different decisions than they would otherwise (see Section 3.2 and Section
3.3). This potential effect is not modeled by our agents (see Section 3.1). More
generally, even if we have a single agent in our setup trading with other unspec-
ified market participants, the parameters in his fundamental value model might
be inaccurate (see Section 3.1 and Section 3.3).
d) No agent revises the general class of his beliefs, admissible strategies, or objectives
on our time horizon (see Sections 3.1 - Section 3.2). In some cases, a mini-flash
crash will not occur if this period is fairly short but will if it is too long (see
Lemmas 4.2 and 5.1).
e) Every agent is averse to his position’s apparent volatility risks (see Section 3.2).
In some cases, there will be no mini-flash crash when our agents are sufficiently
averse to these risks; otherwise, there will be one (see Lemmas 4.2 and 5.1).
f) Every agent has the opportunity to update the drift parameter in his price model
based upon his observations (see Section 3.1). In some cases, a mini-flash crash
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will unfold because our agents are too easily persuaded to revise their priors (see
Lemmas 4.2 and 5.1).
g) Every agent has a model for how prices are affected by the temporary impact
of trades (see Section 3.1). In some cases, there will be a mini-flash crash if our
agents sufficiently underestimate the role of aggregate temporary impact. No
such disturbance will occur otherwise. Our agents may be more prone to induce
mini-flash crashes in this way when there are many of them (see Lemmas 4.2 and
5.1).
Notice that some of our agents’ human errors directly cause mini-flash crashes, though
not all (see Proposition 4.2). We highlight this observation in Figures 1 - 3. Implicitly,
the occasional absence of mini-flash crashes also agrees with (i). Despite the regularity
of these disruptions on a market-wide basis, individual securities may rarely experience
such an event. Similarly, traders’ models and strategies do roughly achieve their intended
goals much of the time, which we observe as well (see Proposition 4.2).
Several key ideas from the endogenous feedback loop theory are present in our paper.
For example, if a mini-flash crash does occur, it almost surely does so because of “en-
dogenous triggering effects.” Specifically, our mini-flash crashes arise when some of our
agents buy or sell at faster and faster rates, which they only do because they started
trading more rapidly in the first place (see Section 3.3 and Lemma 4.1). As predicted
by this theory, some of our agents also “converge on the same strategy” during mini-
flash crashes: In certain cases, the agents driving these events all buy or sell together
with the same (exploding) growth rate (see Theorems 5.1 and 5.2). Figures 5, 8, and 11
graphically illustrate this partial synchronization.
We do not explicitly model liquidity providers in our framework, as we view our agents
as submitting market orders to a single venue (see Section 3.3). We still view our paper
as reflecting (iii), at least in some sense, since our mini-flash crashes can be accompanied
by both high and low trading volumes (see Corollary 3.1 and Theorems 5.1 and 5.2).
Visualizations of this point are provided in Figures 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 12.
3. Agents and the Execution Price
In this section we describe our agents and their individual optimal execution problems.
We end this section by introducing the “true” execution price.
3.1. Agents’ Models. Our agents trade continuously by optimally selecting a trading
rate from a particular class of admissible strategies. To motivate our specifications of
their choices and objectives, we first define their models and beliefs.
All trades submitted at time t are executed immediately at the price Sexct . At each
time t, every agent observes the correct value of Sexct . No agent knows the true dynamics
of the stochastic process Sexc, though.
In our framework, Agent j ∈ {1, · · · , N}’s models the the risky asset without his own
trading by
Sunfj,t = Sj,0 + βjt+Wj,t, t ∈ [0, T ] , (3.1)
whereWj is a Wiener process and βj is a normally distributed with mean µj and variance
ν2j which is independent of the Wiener process. (In what follows we will write down Pj
for the probability measure of agent j.) This drift term represents the price pressure
that Agent j believes will arise due to the trades of (other) institutional investors. Agent
j approximates the average behavior of uninformed or noise traders using the Brownian
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term.1 If ν2j > 0, then we call Agent j an uncertain agent. If ν
2
j = 0, then we call Agent
j a certain agent. Regardless of whether he is certain or uncertain in this sense, we will
soon see that Agent j can always be viewed as certain about many things, e.g, he will not
change the form of his models, objectives, or admissible strategies on [0, T ]. From this
perspective, one might partially connect our work on mini-flash crashes to explanations
of longer term financial bubbles based on overconfident investors ([37]).
Intuitively, Agent j’s selection of (3.1) makes the most sense when N is large and
T is short. Notice that Agent j makes no attempt to precisely estimate the number
of other market participants, nor their individual goals or beliefs. That he believes he
cannot improve the predictive accuracy of (3.1) by doing so appears to suggest that
the population of traders is of sufficient size. Together with the fact that real drifts
and volatilities are non-constant, (3.1) only seems even potentially plausible over short
periods.
Let Aj be the space of Funfj,t -adapted processes θj of trading speeds such that θj,· (ω)
is continuous on [0, T ] for Pj-almost surely,
EPj
[∫ T
0
θ2j,t dt
]
<∞, (3.2)
and
xj +
∫ T
0
θj,t dt = 0 Pj − a.s. (3.3)
For any θj ∈ Aj , we denote by
X
θj
j,t = xj +
∫ t
0
θj,s ds, (3.4)
the agent’s inventory.
The agent models the execution price as Sexcj,θj , which is given by
Sexcj,θj,t = S
unf
j,t + ηj,per
∫ t
0
θj,s ds+
1
2
ηj,temθj,t, t ∈ [0, T ] . (3.5)
Agent j has chosen the deterministic positive constants ηj,per and ηj,tem in (3.5) prior
to time t = 0. Agent j could be viewed as taking into account his own effects on the
execution price via an Almgren-Chriss reduced-form model ([7], [6], [9]). ηj,per would
denote Agent j’s estimate for his permanent price impact parameter, while he would
approximate his temporary price impact parameter with ηj,tem.
3.2. Each Agent’s Optimization Problem. Agent j’s objective is to maximize the
following objective function:
EPj
[
−
∫ T
0
θj,t S
exc
j,θj,t
dt− κj
2
∫ T
0
(
X
θj
j,t
)2
dt
]
. (3.6)
This frequently used criteria balances his realized trading revenue and risks associated
with delayed liquidation. Agent j selects the deterministic risk aversion parameter κj > 0
based upon his appetite.
Let us denote
τj (t) ,
√
κj
ηj,tem
(T − t) , t ∈ [0, T ] . (3.7)
1 Almgren & Lorenz provide further details regarding the interpretation of (3.1) ([8]). A possible
extension of our work could replace (3.1) with one of the more recent models considered in the literature
on optimal trading problems with a learning aspect ([8], [21], [14], [25], [36], [24], [17]).
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Lemma 3.1. (3.6) has a unique optimizer θ⋆j ∈ Aj almost surely. When ω ∈ Ωj is
chosen such that Wj,· (ω) is continuous on [0, T ], X
θ⋆j
j (ω) satisfies the linear ODE
θ⋆j,t (ω) = −
√
κj
ηj,tem
coth (τj (t))X
θ⋆j
j,t (ω)
+
tanh (τj (t) /2)
[
µj + ν
2
j
(
Sunfj,t (ω)− Sj,0
)]
√
ηj,temκj
(
1 + ν2j t
) , t ∈ (0, T )
X
θ⋆j
j,0 (ω) = xj . (3.8)
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
Remark 3.1. The first term in (3.8) arises from our constraint that Agent j must liquidate
by the terminal time (see (3.3)). In fact, the weighting factor
−
√
κj
ηj,tem
coth (τj (t))
tends to −∞ as t ↑ T . Intuitively, the reason that Agent j believes that Xθ
⋆
j
j,t and θ
⋆
j,t
remain finite as t ↑ T is that Xθ
⋆
j
j,t tends very rapidly to zero.
Agent j thinks that he learns about βj ’s realized value over time, which is captured
by the second term in (3.8) since
EPj
[
βj
∣∣Funfj,t ] = µj + ν
2
j
(
Sunfj,t − Sj,0
)
1 + ν2j t
Pj − a.s. (3.9)
([34]). The factor
tanh (τj (t) /2)√
ηj,temκj
is bounded by 1/
√
ηj,temκj and tends to zero as t ↑ T .
The second term may either dampen or amplify the effects of the first. Agent j believes
that the weighting factors reflect that his need to liquidate must eventually overwhelm
his desire to profit by trading in the direction of the risky asset’s drift.
An immediate observation from Lemma 3.1 is the following observation for certain
agents, which we record as a corollary for ease of referencing.
Corollary 3.1. If ν2j = 0, then X
θ⋆j
j does not depend on S
unf
j . In particular, it is
deterministic and satisfies the linear ODE
θ⋆j,t = −
√
κj
ηj,tem
coth (τj (t))X
θ⋆j
j,t +
µj tanh (τj (t) /2)√
ηj,temκj
, t ∈ (0, T )
X
θ⋆j
j,0 = xj . (3.10)
3.3. Execution Price. We now specify how Sexc actually evolves. While each agent
observes the same realized path of this process, in general, no agent knows the correct dy-
namics.2 An agent’s trading decisions are entirely determined by his beliefs, preferences,
and observations of a single realized path of Sexc.
2 There is a single trivial case where this is not true. If N = 1, β˜ = β, ν2
1
= 0, η˜1,tem = η1,tem, and
η˜1,per = η1,per , our lone agent’s model would be exactly right.
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Let
(
Ω˜, F˜ ,
{
F˜t
}
0≤t≤T
, P˜
)
be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual condi-
tions. The space is equipped with an F˜t-Wiener process under P˜ , which we denote by
W˜ . We also have the following deterministic real constants:
β˜, S0, η˜1,per, . . . , η˜N,per, and η˜1,tem, . . . , η˜N,tem.
β˜ can be arbitrary; however, the remaining constants are strictly positive.
The true execution price Sexc under P˜ is the F˜t-adapted process
Sexct = S0 + β˜t+
N∑
i=1
η˜i,per
(
X
θ⋆i
i,t − xi
)
+
1
2
N∑
i=1
η˜i,temθ
⋆
i,t + W˜t, t ∈ [0, T ] . (3.11)
Equation (3.11) can be viewed as a multi-agent extension of the Almgren-Chriss model
([7], [6], [9]). Models of this form, particularly when the η˜j,tem’s (η˜j,per ’s) are all identical,
have been applied in the context of predatory trading ([13]). On the other hand, [12, 15]
consider a mean-field game model where the interactions between the players are through
the price as it is here. Although both of these papers address latency and learning in their
models misspecification of agents’s models is an important element in our framework.
Moreover, our agents do not observe each other or know each other’s parameters. In
fact, in our finite player set-up they do not even know the number of players N .
In what follows we will say that a mini-flash crash occurs, if the Sexct tends to either
+∞ or −∞ on our time horizon.
The parameters η˜j,per and η˜j,tem are the correct values of Agent j’s permanent and
temporary price impact parameters, respectively. We allow these quantities to have arbi-
trary relationships to Agent j’s corresponding estimates ηj,per and ηj,tem. For instance,
Agent j might underestimate his permanent impact (ηj,per < η˜j,per) but perfectly esti-
mate his temporary impact (ηj,tem = η˜j,tem). Similarly, Agent j’s prior βj for the correct
drift β˜ may be accurate or severely mistaken. Comparing our descriptions of Sexcj,θj in
(3.5) and Sexc in (3.11), we see that Agent j proxies each term in (3.11) as follows:
ηj,per
(
X
θ⋆j
j,t − xj
)
←→ η˜j,per
(
X
θ⋆j
j,t − xj
)
1
2
ηj,temθ
⋆
j,t ←→
1
2
η˜j,temθ
⋆
j,t
Sj,0 + βjt+Wj,t ←→ S0 + β˜t+
∑
i6=j
η˜i,per
(
X
θ⋆i
i,t − xi
)
+
1
2
∑
i6=j
η˜i,temθ
⋆
i,t + W˜t.
4. Analysis of the Dynamical System
When our agents implement the strategies that they believe are optimal (see Lemma
3.1) but Sexc has the dynamics in (3.11), what happens? The goal of Section 4 is to offer
some general answers to this question.
To simplify our presentation, we begin by introducing and analyzing additional no-
tation (see Definition 4.1 and Lemma B.1). We find that our agents’ inventories and
trading rates evolve according to a particular ODE system with stochastic coefficients
(see Lemma 4.1). Under certain conditions, the system can have a singular point (see
Lemma 4.2). For convenience, we study what unfolds when this singular point is of the
first kind (see Proposition 4.1). We also examine the case in which there is no singular
point (Proposition 4.2).
We will have an even mix of deterministic and stochastic maps. In what follows, we
always explicitly indicate ω-dependence to distinguish between the two. Our equations
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are solved pathwise, so we do not encounter probabilistic concerns. We will fix ω ∈ Ω˜
such that W˜· (ω) has a continuous path.
Definition 4.1. Define the maps
Φi : [0, T ] −→ R
A : [0, T ] −→ MK (R)
B : [0, T ) −→ MK (R)
C (·, ω) : [0, T ] −→ RK
by
Φi (t) ,
tanh (τi (t) /2) ν
2
i√
ηi,temκi (1 + ν2i t)
Aik (t) ,


1− 1
2
(η˜i,tem − ηi,tem) Φi (t) if i = k
−1
2
η˜k,temΦi (t) if i 6= k
Bik (t) ,

 (η˜i,per − ηi,per)Φi (t)−
√
κi
ηi,tem
coth (τi (t)) if i = k
η˜k,perΦi (t) if i 6= k
Ci (t, ω) , Φi (t)

µiν2i + (S0 − Si,0) + β˜t−
∑
k≤K
k 6=i
η˜k,perxk − xi (η˜i,per − ηi,per)
+
∑
k>K
η˜k,per
(
X
θ⋆k
k,t − xk
)
+
1
2
∑
k>K
η˜k,temθ
⋆
k,t + W˜t (ω)
]
.
Here, i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} are the uncertain agents, whose behavior we are set out to charac-
terize. The behavior of the certain agents are already described. They are not influenced
by the execution price but they do have an influence on it.
Observe that we can now write the dynamics in (3.8) as
θ⋆j,t (ω) = −
√
κj
ηj,tem
coth (τj (t))X
θ⋆j
j,t (ω) + Φj (t)
[
µj
ν2j
+
(
Sunfj,t (ω)− Sj,0
)]
when Agent j is uncertain.
Definition 4.2. When detA has a root on [0, T ], we let te denote the smallest one (see
Lemma B.1).
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that detA has a root on [0, T ]. If te > 0, then S
exc (ω), the
X
θ⋆j
j (ω)’s and the θ
⋆
j (ω)’s are all uniquely defined and continuous on [0, te). Moreover,
the uncertain agents’ strategies are characterized by
A (t) θu,⋆t (ω) = B (t)X
u,θ⋆
t (ω) + C (t, ω) , t ∈ (0, te)
Xu,θ
⋆
0 (ω) = x
u, (4.1)
where θu,⋆t (ω) denotes the first K-entries of θ
⋆
t (ω). When detA does not have a root on
[0, T ], the same statements hold after replacing te with T .
Proof. See Appendix B.1. 
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Lemma 4.1 does not address the behavior of our uncertain agents’ inventories and
trading rates as t ↑ te or t ↑ T . The difficulties are that A is non-invertible at te, while
B’s entries explode at T (see Lemma B.1).
The approach for resolving these issues is well-established (see Chapter 6 of [16]). We
sketch the key points when detA has a root on [0, T ] and te > 0. Analyzing the effects
of B’s explosion at T is similar (see Proposition 4.2).
We begin by considering the homogeneous equation corresponding to (4.1):
A (t) X˙ut (ω) = B (t)X
u
t (ω) , t ∈ (0, te)
Xu0 (ω) = x
u. (4.2)
We change notation to emphasize that (4.2) no longer describes the uncertain agents’
optimal strategies. We next write (4.2) in a more convenient form.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that detA has a root on [0, T ] and te > 0. Near te, the solution
of (4.2) satisfies
(t− te)m+1 X˙ut (ω) = D (t)Xut (ω) . (4.3)
In (4.3), m is a nonnegative integer such that the multiplicity of the zero of detA at te
is (m+ 1). D is a particular analytic map for which D (te) has rank 0 or 1 (see (B.5)).
Proof. See Appendix B.2. 
Definition 4.3. Let us denote the unique non-zero eigenvalue of D (te) in the above
lemma by λ.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that detA has a root on [0, T ], te > 0, and m = 0. If λ 6∈ Z,
then for some small ρ > 0,
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) = P (t)

K−1∑
j=1
(
yj (ω)−
∫ t
te−ρ
Fj (s, ω)
|s− te| ds
)
vj
+ |t− te|λ
(
yK (ω)−
∫ t
te−ρ
FK (s, ω)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
)
vK
]
(4.4)
for t ∈ (te − ρ, te). Here,
• {v1, . . . , vK} is an eigenbasis for D (te) (vK corresponds to λ);
• P is a (non-singular-)matrix-valued analytic function on [te − ρ, te] such that
P (te) = IK (see (B.6));
• {y1 (ω) , . . . , yK (ω)} are constants (see (B.9));
• and {F1 (·, ω) , . . . , FK (·, ω)} are continuous real-valued functions on [te − ρ, te]
(see (B.9)).
We get θu,⋆ (ω) and Sexc (ω) on (te − ρ, te) by differentiating (4.4) and by substituting
Xθ
⋆
(ω) and θ⋆ (ω) into (3.11), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix B.3. 
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that detA does not have a root on [0, T ]. Then Sexc (ω), the
X
θ⋆j
j (ω)’s and the θ
⋆
j (ω)’s are all uniquely defined and continuous on [0, T ]. Moreover,
lim
t↑T
Xθ
⋆
t (ω) = 0. (4.5)
Remark 4.1. Each agent believes that his terminal inventory will be zero almost surely
(see (3.3)). Proposition 4.2 specifies conditions under which the agents are effectively
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Proof. See Appendix B.4. 
5. Explicit Characterizations of Flash Crashes for Semi-Symmetric
Uncertain Agents
In this section we thoroughly analyze a broad but tractable class of scenarios. This
will enable us to both theoretically and numerically investigate the occurrence of mini-
flash crashes. We specify that our uncertain agents’ parameters are identical, except
for their initial inventories xj , means of their initial drift priors µj , and their initial
estimates for the fundamental price Sj,0. Such agents are nearly symmetric, so we call
them semi-symmetric.
Definition 5.1. We say that our uncertain agents are semi-symmetric when there are
positive constants
η˜tem, ηtem, η˜per , ηper, ν
2, and κ
such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
η˜i,tem = η˜tem, ηi,tem = ηtem, η˜per = η˜i,per ,
ηi,per = ηper, ν
2
i = ν
2, κi = κ.
Since τj ’s and the Φj ’s are the same for j ≤ K (see Definitions 3.7, 4.1, and 5.1). We
denote these functions by τ and Φ, respectively.
Definition 5.1 implies that the diagonal entries of A are identical, as are the off-diagonal
entries. The same is true for B (see Definition 4.1). Such a simplification considerably
reduces the difficulties in computing detA, λ, and an eigenbasis for D (te) (see (C.3) and
Lemma 5.2). The xj ’s, µj ’s, and Sj,0’s only enter in C, which also has a nice structure
(see (C.13)).
5.1. Results.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that the uncertain agents are semi-symmetric. Then detA has a
root on [0, T ] and te > 0 if and only if
ν2 (Kη˜tem − ηtem) tanh
(
T
2
√
κ
ηtem
)
√
ηtemκ
> 2. (5.1)
In this case, the zero of detA (·) at te is of multiplicity 1.
Remark 5.1. By varying our parameters in (5.1) one at a time we can obtain the following
interpretations discussed in Section 2:
i) (5.1) holds when ν2 is high. Since ν2 is the variance of the uncertain agents’ drift
priors, we are led to (f) in Section 2.
ii) (5.1) holds when (Kη˜tem − ηtem) is high. A given uncertain agent believes
that his own temporary impact parameter is ηtem, while the actual collective
temporary impact parameter induced by the uncertain agents is Kη˜tem. Then
(Kη˜tem − ηtem) is large whenever each uncertain agent severely underestimates
his own temporary impact or there are many uncertain agents, giving (g) in
Section 2.
iii) (5.1) holds when T is high. Since [0, T ] is our time horizon, we get (d) in Section
2. Note that T must be small enough for our agents’ modeling rationale to hold
(see Section 3); however, T need not be too large here, as the value of tanh
reaches 95% of its supremum on [0,∞) for arguments greater than 1.8.
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iv) (5.1) holds when κ is low. We conclude (e) in Section 2, as κ measures our
uncertain agents’ aversion to volatility risks (see Section 3.2). Observe that both
the numerator and the denominator of the LHS in (C.1) roughly look like
√
κ for
small κ; however, when κ is large, the whole LHS looks like 1/
√
κ since tanh is
bounded by 1 on [0,∞).
Proof. See Appendix C.1. 
Remark 5.2. As observed in (C.4), when detA has a root on [0, T ], we have
Φ (te) =
2
Kη˜tem − ηtem . (5.2)
No agent would think to compute te since they all believe that a mini-flash crash is a
null event; however, (5.2) makes it especially clear that they could not do so anyway.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that the uncertain agents are semi-symmetric and (5.1) holds.
Then
λ =
2
[√
κ
ηtem
coth (τ (te))− 2
(
Kη˜per − ηper
Kη˜tem − ηtem
)]
(Kη˜tem − ηtem) Φ˙ (te)
(5.3)
and the corresponding eigenvector is vK = [1, . . . , 1]
⊤
. By slightly perturbing η˜per and/or
ηper, if necessary, we can ensure that λ 6∈ Z. In this case, D (te) is diagonalizable and
the remaining vectors in an eigenbasis for D (te) (all with the eigenvalue zero) are
v1 = [−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0]⊤ , . . . , vK−1 = [−1, 0, . . . , 0, 1]⊤ .
Remark 5.3. With the exceptions of η˜per and ηper , all parameters in (5.3) determine
whether or not detA has a root on [0, T ] (see Lemma 5.1). They also fix the value of te
(see Remark 5.2). Hence, to interpret (5.3), we only consider the roles of η˜per and ηper .
These parameters enter (5.3) via
Kη˜per − ηper
Kη˜tem − ηtem . (5.4)
Intuitively, (5.4) can be viewed as the ratio of two terms: The numerator measures
how far a given uncertain agent’s estimate of his own permanent impact is from the
uncertain agents’ actual collective permanent impact. The denominator, which must be
positive due to Lemma 5.1, is the corresponding measure for the temporary impact. One
might call (5.4) a mistake ratio.
Since Φ˙ (te) < 0 by Lemma B.1, λ is positive only when (5.4) is high enough. We have
λ < 0 when the uncertain agents’ total permanent impact and a single uncertain agent’s’
estimate of his own permanent impact are too close or when his estimate exceeds the
cumulative permanent impact. More precisely,
{λ > 0} ⇐⇒
{
1
2
√
κ
ηtem
coth (τ (te)) (Kη˜tem − ηtem) < Kη˜per − ηper
}
{λ < 0} ⇐⇒
{
1
2
√
κ
ηtem
coth (τ (te)) (Kη˜tem − ηtem) > Kη˜per − ηper
}
. (5.5)
Whether a mini-flash crash is accompanied by high or low trading volumes is effectively
determined by which inequality in (5.5) holds (see Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 and Sections 2,
6.2, and 6.3).
Proof. See Appendix C.2. 
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Theorem 5.1. Suppose that the uncertain agents are semi-symmetric and (5.1) holds.
Assume that λ 6∈ Z and λ < 0 (see Lemma 5.2). Let ρ, yK (ω), and FK (·, ω) be defined
as in Proposition 4.1. Then{
yK (ω) > lim
t↑te
∫ t
te−ρ
FK (s, ω)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
}
(5.6)
=⇒
{
lim
t↑te
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) = lim
t↑te
θu,⋆t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]⊤ , lim
t↑te
Sexct (ω) = +∞
}
and{
yK (ω) < lim
t↑te
∫ t
te−ρ
FK (s, ω)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
}
(5.7)
=⇒
{
lim
t↑te
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) = lim
t↑te
θu,⋆t (ω) = [−∞, . . . ,−∞]⊤ , lim
t↑te
Sexct (ω) = −∞
}
.
Moreover,
i) The integral limits in (5.6) and (5.7) exist and are finite.
ii) Either (5.6) or (5.7) holds P˜ -a.s.
iii) At te − ρ, the events (5.6) and (5.7) both have positive P˜ -probability; however,
the P˜ -probability of one event tends to 1 (while the other tends to 0) if we let
ρ ↓ 0.
Remark 5.4. Since P (te) = IK (see Proposition 4.1), (B.9) and Lemma 5.2 imply that
yK (ω) will be large and positive when the uncertain agents hold significant, similar long
positions. yK (ω) will be of high magnitude but negative, if the uncertain agents carry
substantial, similarly-sized short positions. Hence, a spike in Sexc (ω) is more likely when
the uncertain agents are synchronized aggressive buyers, while the odds of a collapse
improve when they are synchronized heavy sellers. These effects play the deciding role
as t ↑ te, as the integral limits in (5.6) and (5.7) are finite.
Still, due to how we can decompose FK in our case (see (C.16)), large fluctuations in
the fundamental price can make the mini-flash crash’s direction unclear until just before
te (see Figure 9).
Proof. See Appendix C.3. 
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that the uncertain agents are semi-symmetric and (5.1) holds.
Assume that λ 6∈ Z and λ > 0 (see Lemma 5.2). Then P˜ -a.s.,
lim
t↑te
Xθ
⋆
t (ω)
exists in RN . If any coordinates of θu,⋆t (ω) explode, then S
exc
t (ω) and all coordinates of
θu,⋆t (ω) explode in the same direction. For instance, when λ > 1,{
lim
t↑te
[
|t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)− W˜t (ω)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
]
= +∞
}
(5.8)
=⇒
{
lim
t↑te
θu,⋆t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]⊤ , lim
t↑te
Sexct (ω) = +∞
}
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and {
lim
t↑te
[
|t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)− W˜t (ω)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
]
= −∞
}
(5.9)
=⇒
{
lim
t↑te
θu,⋆t (ω) = [−∞, . . . ,−∞]⊤ , lim
t↑te
Sexct (ω) = −∞
}
.
Moreover,
i) Either (5.8) or (5.9) holds P˜ -a.s.
ii) At te − ρ, the events (5.8) and (5.9) both have positive P˜ -probability; however,
the P˜ -probability of one event tends to 1 (while the other tends to 0) if we let
ρ ↓ 0.
Remark 5.5. We make no rigorous statement regarding the λ ∈ (0, 1) case. Most of
Theorem 5.2’s proof would still be valid (see Appendix C.3); however, the final estimates
are especially convenient when λ > 1 (see (C.27) - (C.29)). The over-arching purpose of
Theorem 5.2 is only to illustrate that mini-flash crashes can occur in low trading volume
environments (see Section 2). Nevertheless, we suspect that mini-flash crashes might
unfold when λ ∈ (0, 1), e.g., see Section 6.2 and (C.27) - (C.29).
Proof. See Appendix C.3. 
6. Numerical illustrations
6.1. Example 1: No mini-flash crash. Our mini-flash crashes do not always occur
(see Lemmas 4.2 and 5.1). In Section 6.1, we illustrate this by numerically simulating a
scenario in which detA has no root on [0, T ].
By Lemma 5.1 and (C.3), we know that detA is non-vanishing on [0, T ] if and only if
(Kη˜tem − ηtem)Φ (0) < 2. (6.1)
One selection of parameters for which (6.1) is satisfied is
N = 3, K = 2, T = 1, S0 = 100,
β˜ = 1, η˜tem = 1, ηtem = 0.75, η˜per = 1,
ηper = 1, ν
2 = 2, κ = 5, x1 = 2,
x2 = −2, µ1 = 15, µ2 = −10, S1,0 = 100,
S2,0 = 100, η˜3,tem = 1, η3,tem = 1, η˜3,per = 1,
µ3 = −3, ν23 = 2, κ3 = 5, x3 = 2.
(6.2)
In fact, the LHS of (6.1) then equals 1.1095. Observe that there is no need to specify
η3,per and S3,0 as they are irrelevant (see Corollary 3.1, Definition 4.1, and Lemma 4.1).
Again, our purposes are only illustrative here, and we leave the reproduction of a specific
practically meaningful scenario for a future work.
Since K = 2 and N = 3, we have two uncertain agents and one certain agent in the
coming plots. We label the corresponding curves with U1, U2, and C1. For example,
the label U1 will signify a quantity for Agent 1, the first uncertain agent. In Figures 1
and 2, we plot inventories and trading rates. The execution price is depicted in Figure
3.
The diagrams exhibit all of the important qualities that we expect based upon our
theoretical results. Here are a few key features:
i) All agents liquidate their positions by the terminal time T (see (4.5) and Figure
1).
ii) Sexc (ω), the X
θ⋆j
j (ω)’s and the θ
⋆
j (ω)’s are all continuous on [0, T ] (see Proposi-
tion 4.2 and Figures 1 - 3).
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Figure 1. Depiction of the agents’ inventories in Section 6.1.
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Figure 2. Depiction of the agents’ trading rates in Section 6.1.
iii) The uncertain agents’ trading rates appear to exhibit a Brownian component
(see Lemma 3.1 and Figure 2).
iv) The certain agent’s trading rate appears to be smooth on [0, T ] (see Corollary
3.1 and Figure 2).
v) The agents need not either strictly buy or strictly sell throughout [0, T ] (see
Figure 2).
vi) Even so, the agents may decide to strictly buy or strictly sell throughout [0, T ]
(see Figure 2).
vii) The uncertain agents’ trading rates do not appear to synchronize (see Figure 2).
6.2. Example 2: A mini-flash crash with low trading volume. Our mini-flash
crashes can be accompanied by low trading volumes (see Theorem 5.2). In Section 6.2,
we visualize this by studying a concrete scenario in which detA has a root on [0, T ];
te > 0; the zero of detA at te is of multiplicity 1; λ 6∈ Z; and λ > 0. The behavior of the
X
θ⋆j
j (ω)’s is then characterized by Corollary 3.1 and Theorem 5.2. Theorem 5.2 would
rigorously describe Sexct (ω) and the θ
⋆
j,t (ω)’s as t ↑ te, if λ > 1. To improve the quality
of our plots, we consider a situation where λ ∈ (0, 1) instead (see Remark 5.5).
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Figure 3. Depiction of the execution price in Section 6.1.
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Figure 4. Depiction of the agents’ inventories in Section 6.2.
By Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, we must select parameters such that (5.1) is satisfied and
λ =
2
[√
κ
ηtem
coth (τ (te))− 2
(
Kη˜per − ηper
Kη˜tem − ηtem
)]
(Kη˜tem − ηtem) Φ˙ (te)
(6.3)
is a positive non-integer. We can keep most of our choices in (6.2) the same and only
make a few revisions:
η˜tem = 0.5, ηtem = 0.2, η˜per = 0.8,
ηper = 0.025, ν
2 = 3, κ = 1.
(6.4)
As in Section 6.1, we do not seek to replicate a particular historical situation. We
immediately get (5.1), as its LHS is 4.3302. Using Remark 5.2 and (6.3), we can show
that
te = 0.2691 and λ = 0.5939.
Again, we have two uncertain agents and one certain agent. We retain the {U1, U2, C1}-
labeling system from Section 6.1. The inventories, trading rates, and execution price are
plotted in Figures 4 - 6. To aid our illustration, we truncate the time domains in Figures
5 - 6 to [
0, 0.75
(
te − 10−6
)]
and
[
0, te − 10−6
]
for the left and right plots, respectively.
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Figure 5. Depiction of the agents’ trading rates in Section 6.2.
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Figure 6. Depiction of the execution price in Section 6.2.
The qualities that we expect based upon Theorem 5.2, and Remark 5.5 are all present.
We offered some applicable comments in Section 6.1, so we only add a few new observa-
tions here.
i) All agents’ inventories approach a finite limit as t ↑ te (see Theorem 5.2 and
Figure 4).
ii) The execution price and the uncertain agents’ trading rates explode as t ↑ te (see
Theorem 5.2, Remark 5.5 and Figures 5 - 6).
iii) The uncertain agents’ trading rates synchronize as t ↑ te (see Theorem 5.2,
Remark 5.5, and Figure 5).
iv) That an explosion in Sexc (ω) will occur as well as its direction becomes in-
creasingly obvious as t ↑ te; however, it is not necessarily clear at first (see
Theorem 5.2, Remark 5.5, and Figure 6).
6.3. Example 3: A mini-flash crash with high trading volume. Our mini-flash
crashes can also be accompanied by high trading volumes (see Theorem 5.1). We illus-
trate this in Section 6.3 by simulating a case in which detA has a root on [0, T ]; te > 0;
the zero of detA at te is of multiplicity 1; λ 6∈ Z; and λ < 0. The behaviors of Sexc (ω),
the X
θ⋆j
j (ω)’s, and the θ
⋆
j (ω)’s are then described by Corollary 3.1 and Theorem 5.1.
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We especially wish to emphasize the stochastic explosion direction and do this in two
ways.
First, we choose the same deterministic parameters to create Figures 7 - 12. The
difference is that one realization of W˜· is used in Figures 7 - 9, while another is used in
Figures 10 - 12. We denote the corresponding ω’s by ωup and ωdn, since there are spikes
and crashes in the former and latter plots, respectively.
Second, Figures 7 - 9 themselves suggest that the explosion direction is random. This
is particularly true in Figures 8 - 9, since we initially notice that the price rapidly rises as
the uncertain agents’ buying rates synchronize. Only moments before the mini-flash crash
do we see the price collapsing and the uncertain agents’ aggressively selling together.
Now, we need to choose parameters such that (5.1) is satisfied and
λ =
2
[√
κ
ηtem
coth (τ (te))− 2
(
Kη˜per − ηper
Kη˜tem − ηtem
)]
(Kη˜tem − ηtem) Φ˙ (te)
is a negative non-integer due to Lemmas 5.1 and 5.1. Compared to Section 6.2, we set
η˜per = 0.5, ηper = 0.5
and keep every other parameter the same. As in Sections 6.1 - 6.2, we do not have in
mind a special historical example here. Since we have only changed η˜per and ηper , the
values of (Kη˜tem − ηtem)Φ (0) and te do not differ from Section 6.2; however, λ is now
negative:
(Kη˜tem − ηtem)Φ (0) = 4.3302, te = 0.2691, and λ = −0.4531.
The numbers of uncertain and certain agents are still two and one, respectively. We
also retain the {U1, U2, C1}-labeling system from Sections 6.1 - 6.2. Figures 7 and 10
depict the agents’ inventories. We plot the agents’ trading rates in Figures 8 and 11.
The execution price appears in Figures 9 and 12. To help with our visualization, the
time domains in the left plots in Figures 7 - 9 and Figures 10 - 12 are truncated to[
0, 0.94
(
te − 10−6
)]
and
[
0, 0.75
(
te − 10−6
)]
, respectively.
Our observations regarding Figures 7 - 12 are in agreement with Corollary 3.1 and
Theorem 5.1. We have already made note of many important aspects in Sections 6.1 -
6.2 and only remark upon the new details.
i) The execution price, as well as the uncertain agents’ inventories and trading
rates, all explode in the same direction as t ↑ te (see Theorem 5.1 and Figures 7
- 12).
ii) The explosions take place at the deterministic time te (see Theorem 5.1 and
Figures 7 - 12).
iii) The explosion direction depends on ω ∈ Ω˜ (see Theorem 5.1 and Figures 7 - 12).
iv) The explosion direction cannot be known with complete certainty before te (see
Theorem 5.1 and Figures 7 - 12).
v) The explosion rates in the price and uncertain agents’ trading rates in Section
6.2 are slower than in Section 6.3 (see Figures 5 - 6, Figures 8 - 9, and Figures 11
- 12). We did not explicitly state this previously; however, this is to be expected
since trading rates are integrable in Section 6.2 but not in Section 6.3.
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Figure 7. Depiction of the agents’ inventories for ωdn in Section 6.3.
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Figure 8. Depiction of the agents’ trading rates for ωdn in Section 6.3.
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Figure 9. Depiction of the execution price for ωdn in Section 6.3.
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Figure 10. Depiction of the agents’ inventories for ωup in Section 6.3.
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Figure 11. Depiction of the agents’ trading rates for ωup in Section 6.3.
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Figure 12. Depiction of the execution price for ωup in Section 6.3.
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7. conclusion
In this paper we show how mini-flash crashes might occur when agents learn and
make their decisions based upon misspecified models. We give a necessary and sufficient
condition for a mini-flash crash to occur and observe that if the agents
i) are too uncertain about their prior information
ii) sufficiently underestimate the aggregate temporary impact
iii) have long trading periods
iv) have low risk aversion
then mini flash crashes occur.
Our numerical section has three main examples illustrating our three main results.
In the first example, we see that not all human errors directly cause mini-flash crashes
illustrating Proposition 4.2. Despite the regularity of the human errors on a market-
wide basis, individual securities may rarely experience such an event. Similarly, traders’
models and strategies do roughly achieve their intended goals much of the time, as it is
observed in the real markets.
The two other examples are about the nature of the mini-flash crashes. If a mini-flash
crash does occur, it almost surely does so because of “endogenous triggering effects.” As
predicted by Theorems 5.1 and 5.2), some of our agents also “converge on the same strat-
egy” during mini-flash crashes: In certain cases, the agents driving these events all buy
or sell together with the same (exploding) growth rate. The two theorems and the ex-
amples illustrating them are to demonstrate that mini-flash crashes can be accompanied
by both high and low trading volumes.
Appendix A. Section 3 Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1. Step 1: Denote the usual Pj -augmentation of
{
Funfj,t
}
0≤t≤T
by
{
F˜unfj,t
}
0≤t≤T
. Let A˜j be the space of F˜unfj,t -progressively measurable processes θj
such that (3.2) and (3.3) hold. We, again, define the processX
θj
j by (3.4) for any strategy
θj ∈ A˜j . Agent j’s auxiliary problem is to maximize
EPj
[
−
∫ T
0
θj,t S
exc
j,θj ,t
dt− κj
2
∫ T
0
(
X
θj
j,t
)2
dt
]
(A.1)
over θj ∈ A˜j . It is not difficult to show that
EPj
[
βj
∣∣∣F˜unfj,t ] = EPj [βj∣∣∣Funfj,t ] Pj − a.s. (A.2)
Step 2: By (3.5) and (3.4),
−
∫ T
0
θj,t S
exc
j,θj,t
dt = −
∫ T
0
θj,t S
unf
j,t dt−
∫ T
0
θj,t
[
ηj,per
(
X
θj
j,t − xj
)
+
1
2
ηj,temθj,t
]
dt
for θj ∈ A˜j . Section 7.4 of [34] and (3.1) imply that the process
{
W j,t
}
0≤t≤T
with
W j,t , S
unf
j,t − Sj,0 −
∫ t
0
EPj
[
βj
∣∣Funfj,s ] ds
is an Funfj,t -Wiener process under Pj and
Sunfj,t = Sj,0 +
∫ t
0
EPj
[
βj
∣∣Funfj,s ] ds+W j,t. (A.3)
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After integrating by parts and recalling (3.4) and (A.3), we get
EPj
[
−
∫ T
0
θj,t S
unf
j,t dt
]
= EPj
[
−Xθjj,TSunfj,T +
∫ T
0
X
θj
j,tE
Pj
[
βj
∣∣Funfj,t ] dt
]
+ xjSj,0.
We also have
EPj
[
−
∫ T
0
θj,t
[
ηj,per
(
X
θj
j,t − xj
)
+
1
2
ηj,temθj,t
]
dt
]
= EPj
[
−1
2
ηj,per
(
X
θj
j,T − xj
)2
− 1
2
ηj,tem
∫ T
0
θ2j,t dt
]
.
Now X
θj
j,T = 0 Pj-a.s. by the definition of A˜j in Step 1. Since xj , Sj,0 and Sunfj,T do
not depend on Agent j’s choice of θj ∈ A˜j , (A.2) implies that θ⋆j maximizes (A.1) over
θj ∈ A˜j if and only if it maximizes
EPj
[∫ T
0
X
θj
j,tE
Pj
[
βj
∣∣F˜unfj,t ] dt− 12ηj,tem
∫ T
0
θ2j,t dt−
κj
2
∫ T
0
(
X
θj
j,t
)2
dt
]
. (A.4)
Clearly, θ⋆j maximizes (A.4) over θj ∈ A˜j if and only if it minimizes
EPj

1
2
∫ T
0

Xθjj,t − E
Pj
[
βj
∣∣F˜unfj,t ]
κj


2
dt+
ηj,tem
2κj
∫ T
0
θ2j,t dt

 . (A.5)
Step 3: Recall the definition of τj(·) from (3.7) and let
Kj (t, s) ,
√
κj
ηj,tem
(
sinh (τj (s))
cosh (τj (t))− 1
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ s < T
βˆj,t , E
Pj
[
1
κj
(
1− 1
cosh (τj (t))
)
·
∫ T
t
EPj
[
βj
∣∣F˜unfj,s ]Kj (t, s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣ F˜unfj,t
]
, t ∈ [0, T ) .
(A.6)
We see from Theorem 3.2 of [10] that (A.5) has a unique solution θ⋆j ∈ A˜j . Moreover,
the corresponding optimal inventory process X
θ⋆j
j satisfies the linear ODE
dX
θ⋆j
j,t =
√
κj
ηj,tem
coth (τj (t))
(
βˆj,t −Xθ
⋆
j
j,t
)
dt
X
θ⋆j
j,0 = xj (A.7)
dPj ⊗ dt-a.s. on Ωj × [0, T ).
Using Fubini’s theorem and (A.2), we get that
EPj
[∫ T
t
EPj
[
βj
∣∣∣F˜unfj,s ]Kj (t, s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣ F˜unfj,t
]
= EPj
[
βj
∣∣∣Funfj,t ] , Pj − a.s. (A.8)
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The tanh half-angle formula together with (3.9) and (A.6) imply that (A.7) can be re-
written as
θ⋆j,t = −
√
κj
ηj,tem
coth (τj (t))X
θ⋆j
j,t
+
tanh (τj (t) /2)
[
µj + ν
2
j
(
Sunfj,t − Sj,0
)]
√
ηj,temκj
(
1 + ν2j t
) , t ∈ (0, T )
X
θ⋆j
j,0 = xj . (A.9)
Step 4: We know that θ⋆j satisfies (3.2) and (3.3), as all strategies in A˜j have these
properties. Now Wj,· (ω) is continuous on [0, T ] for Pj-almost every ω ∈ Ωj . When
such an ω is chosen, (A.9) becomes (3.8). The latter is a first order linear ODE with
continuous coefficients, so θ⋆j,· (ω) is continuous on [0, T ) (e.g., by Chapter 1.2 of [38]).
Since our terminal inventory constraint is deterministic, we observe that
lim
t↑T
θ⋆j,t (ω)
exists and is finite from (28) and (29) in the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [10], as well as (A.8)
in Step 3. In particular, we can view the paths of θ⋆j on [0, T ] as Pj-a.s. continuous.
3
We conclude by noting that θ⋆j is also Funfj,t -adapted by (28) and (29) in the proof of
Theorem 3.2 in [10], (3.9), and (A.8) in Step 3.

Appendix B. Section 4 Proofs
We frequently reference various easy properties of the functions in Definition 4.1. We
collect these below for convenience. We will leave the proof to the reader.
Lemma B.1. Fix j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. We have the following:
i) Φj is a strictly decreasing nonnegative function on [0, T ] with Φj (T ) = 0.
ii) The entries of A are analytic on [0, T ] and A (T ) = IK .
iii) If detA has a root on [0, T ], we can find the smallest one which we denote by te.
In this case, te < T and the zero of detA at te is of finite multiplicity.
iv) The entries of B are analytic on [0, T ) but
lim
t↑T
Bjj (t) = −∞.
v) C (·, ω)’s entries are continuous on [0, T ].
B.1. Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. At each time t, Agent j observes the
correct value of Sexct (ω), interprets this value as the realized value of S
exc
j,θ⋆
j
,t (ω), and
computes Sunfj,t (ω).
4 By (3.5), it follows that
Sexct (ω) = S
exc
j,θ⋆
j
,t (ω)
= Sunfj,t (ω) + ηj,per
(
X
θ⋆j
j,t (ω)− xj
)
+
1
2
ηj,temθ
⋆
j,t (ω) . (B.1)
3Alternatively, we could give an argument using singular point theory as in Section 4.
4By abuse of notation, we evaluate Sexc
j,θ⋆
j
,t
and Sunfj,t are evaluated at ω; however, Agent j would
evaluate these quantities at some ωj ∈ Ωj . We adopt similar conventions in the sequel without further
comment.
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After substituting (3.11) into (B.1), we have
Sunfj,t (ω)− Sj,0
= (S0 − Sj,0) + β˜t+
∑
i≤K
i6=j
η˜i,per
(
X
θ⋆i
i,t (ω)− xi
)
+
∑
i>K
η˜i,per
(
X
θ⋆i
i,t − xi
)
+
1
2
∑
i≤K
i6=j
η˜i,temθ
⋆
i,t (ω) +
1
2
∑
i>K
η˜i,temθ
⋆
i,t
+ (η˜j,per − ηj,per)
(
X
θ⋆j
j,t (ω)− xj
)
+
1
2
(η˜j,tem − ηj,tem) θ⋆j,t (ω) + W˜t (ω) . (B.2)
The quantity on the LHS of (B.2) plays a role in determining Agent j’s strategy
(see Lemma 3.1). Substituting (B.2) into (3.8) and applying the half-angle formula for
tanh (·), we get
Ajj (t) θ
⋆
j,t (ω)−
∑
i≤K
i6=j
Aji (t) θ
⋆
i,t (ω)
= Bjj (t)X
θ⋆j
j,t (ω) +
∑
i≤K
i6=j
Bji (t)X
θ⋆i
i,t (ω) + Cj (t, ω) .
It follows that the uncertain agents’ strategies are characterized by the ODE system
A (t) θu,⋆t (ω) = B (t)X
u,θ⋆
t (ω) + C (t, ω)
Xu,θ
⋆
0 (ω) = x
u. (B.3)
Corollary 3.1, Lemma B.1 and a standard existence and uniqueness theorem (see Sections
1.1 and 3.1 of [11]) finish the argument. 
B.2. Proof of Lemma 4.2. As t ↑ te,{
A (t) X˙ut (ω) = B (t)X
u
t (ω)
}
⇐⇒{
[detA (t)] X˙ut (ω) = [adjA (t)]B (t)X
u
t (ω)
}
.
Here, adj denotes the usual adjugate operator.
We can find a non-negative integer m such that the multiplicity of the zero of detA
at te is (m+ 1) by Lemma B.1. Hence, there is a unique non-vanishing analytic function
f such that
detA (t) = (t− te)m+1 f (t) (B.4)
on a small neighborhood of te. Note that f is non-vanishing, as the zeroes of detA are
isolated and detA (T ) = 1 (see Lemma B.1). We then define the analytic (see Lemma
B.1) map D by
D (t) , [adjA (t)]B (t) /f (t) (B.5)
and arrive at (4.3).
Since detA (·) has a root at te, the rank of A (te) is no more than K− 1. We conclude
by observing that adj A (te) has rank 1 when A (te) has rank K− 1; otherwise, adj A (te)
must be the zero matrix. The comments about the rank of D (te) immediately follow. 
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B.3. Proof of Proposition 4.1. D (te) 6= 0 since λ 6= 0. Then (4.2) has a singular
point of the first kind at te (see our discussion above). λ 6∈ Z by hypothesis, so Theorem
6.5 of [16] implies that a fundamental solution of (4.2) on [te − ρ, te) for some ρ > 0 is
given by
P (t) |t− te|D(te) . (B.6)
In (B.6), P (·) is an analytic MK (R)-valued function with P (te) = IK . Moreover, P (t)
is invertible for all t ∈ [te − ρ, te) and5(
P (t) |t− te|R
)−1
= |t− te|−R [P (t)]−1 . (B.7)
The solution of (4.1) satisfies
(t− te) θu,⋆t (ω) = D (t)Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) +
adj [A (s)]C (s, ω)
f (s)
.
near te (argue as in Lemma 4.2). Since
P (t) |t− te|D(te) ρ−D(te) [P (te − ρ)]−1
is also a fundamental solution of (4.3) on [te − ρ, te)6 and equals IK at te − ρ, we can
apply variation of parameters7 to obtain
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω)
= P (t) |t− te|D(te)
[
ρ−D(te) [P (te − ρ)]−1
]
·
[
Xθ
⋆
te−ρ
(ω)
+
∫ t
te−ρ
(
P (te − ρ) ρD(te) |s− te|−D(te) [P (s)]−1
)(adj [A (s)]C (s, ω)
(s− te) f (s)
)
ds
]
. (B.8)
We can find an eigenbasis {v1, . . . , vK} for D (te) such that vK corresponds to λ. We
then define the continuous real-valued functions {F1 (·, ω) , . . . , FK (·, ω)} on [te − ρ, te]
and the constants {y1 (ω) , . . . , yK (ω)} as certain eigenbasis coordinates:
K∑
j=1
Fj (s, ω) vj ,
[P (s)]
−1
adj [A (s)]C (s, ω)
f (s)
K∑
j=1
yj (ω) vj , ρ
−D(te) [P (te − ρ)]−1Xθ⋆te−ρ (ω) . (B.9)
Taken with (B.8), these definitions immediately give (4.4) after recalling that for any
matrix Q ∈MK (R) with eigenvalue γ and corresponding eigenvector v, we have
|t− te|Q v = |t− te|γ v.

5Any fundamental solution of (4.3) is invertible everywhere, as are matrix exponentials.
6See Theorem 2.5 of Coddington & Carlson ([16]).
7See Theorem 2.8 of Coddington & Carlson ([16]).
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B.4. Proof of Proposition 4.2. We know that Sexc (ω), the X
θ⋆j
j (ω)’s and the θ
⋆
j (ω)’s
are all uniquely defined and continuous on [0, T ) (see Lemma 4.1). Corollary 3.1 implies
that X
θ⋆j
j (ω) and θ
⋆
j (ω) are continuous at T for j > K (the certain agents). It also gives
us
lim
t↑T
X
θ⋆j
j,t (ω) = 0
for j > K. It remains to show that
lim
t↑T
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) = 0 and lim
t↑T
θu,⋆t (ω) ∈ RK . (B.10)
As discussed above, one difficulty is that the diagonal entries of B in (4.1) explode at T
(see Lemma B.1); however, the approach for resolving this issue is similar to that used
to analyze solution behavior near te.
First, we show that (4.2) (after replacing te with T ) has a singular point of the first
kind at T . Now sinh (τj (·)) has a zero of multiplicity 1 at T since
d sinh (τj (t))
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
t=T
= −
√
κj
ηj,tem
cosh (τj (t))
∣∣∣∣∣
t=T
= −
√
κj
ηj,tem
.
Hence, there is a unique non-vanishing analytic function gj such that
sinh (τj (t)) = (t− T ) gj (t) and gj (T ) = −
√
κj
ηj,tem
(B.11)
on a small neighborhood of T . Near T , it follows that the entries of (t− T )B (t) are
given by
(t− T )Bik (t) =


(t− T ) (η˜i,per − ηi,per)Φi (t)
−
√
κi
ηi,tem
(
cosh (τi (t))
gi (t)
)
if i = k
(t− T ) η˜k,perΦi (t) if i 6= k
(B.12)
(see Definition 4.1). On this region, the solution of (4.2) satisfies
(t− T ) X˙ut (ω) = A−1 (t) (t− T )B (t)Xut (ω) . (B.13)
By (B.12) and Lemma B.1, (B.13) has a singular point of the first kind at T .
Second, we find a fundamental solution of (B.13) near T . We know that
A−1 (T ) = (t− T )B (t)
∣∣∣∣∣
t=T
= IK
by (B.11), (B.12), and Lemma B.1. Theorem 6.5 of [16] implies that a fundamental
solution of (B.13) on [T − δ, T ) for some δ > 0 is given by
Q (t) |t− T |IK = Q (t) |t− T | . (B.14)
In (B.14), Q is an analytic MK (R)-valued function with Q (T ) = IK . Also, Q (t) is
invertible for all t ∈ [T − δ, T ).8
Finally, we use our fundamental solution to solve (4.1) and conclude the proof. Notice
that tanh (τj (·)) also has a zero of multiplicity 1 at T since
d tanh (τj (t))
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
t=T
= −1
2
√
κj
ηj,tem
sech2 (τj (t) /2)
∣∣∣∣∣
t=T
= −1
2
√
κj
ηj,tem
.
8Any fundamental solution of (B.13) is invertible everywhere.
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There is a unique non-vanishing analytic function hj such that
tanh (τj (t) /2) = (t− T )hj (t) (B.15)
on a neighborhood of T . In particular, the entries of C (t, ω) / (t− T ) near T are given
by
Ci (t, ω)
(t− T ) =
(
hi (t) ν
2
i√
ηi,temκi (1 + ν2i t)
)µiν2i + (S0 − Si,0) + β˜t−
∑
k≤K
k 6=i
η˜k,perxk
− xi (η˜i,per − ηi,per) +
∑
k>K
η˜k,per
(
X
θ⋆k
k,t − xk
)
+
1
2
∑
k>K
η˜k,temθ
⋆
k,t + W˜t (ω)
]
. (B.16)
Since
Q (t) |t− T | δ−1Q−1 (T − δ)
is also a fundamental solution of (4.3) on [T − δ, T )9 and equals IK at T − δ, we can
apply variation of parameters10 to obtain
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω)
= Q (t) |t− T | δ−1Q−1 (T − δ) ·
[
Xθ
⋆
T−δ (ω)
+
∫ t
T−δ
(
Q (T − δ) δ |s− T |−1Q−1 (s)
)
A−1 (s)C (s, ω) ds
]
. (B.17)
By (B.16), (B.17), and Corollary 3.1, we get (B.10). 
Appendix C. Section 5 Proofs
C.1. Proof of Lemma 5.1. First observe that (5.1) is equivalent to
(Kη˜tem − ηtem)Φ (0) > 2, (C.1)
by Definitions 3.7 and 4.1. By Definitions 4.1 and 5.1, we see that A is now given by
Aik (t) ,


1− 1
2
(η˜tem − ηtem)Φ (t) if i = k
−1
2
η˜temΦ (t) if i 6= k
. (C.2)
A short calculation shows that
detA (t) =
[
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
]K−1 [
1− 1
2
(Kη˜tem − ηtem)Φ (t)
]
. (C.3)
The first term in (C.3) is always at least 1. The second term is non-zero at 0 but does
have a root on (0, T ] if and only if (C.1) holds.11 Both of these observations come from
Lemma B.1.
Now, (C.1) implies that Kη˜tem > ηtem. Since te is a zero of detA, we must have that
1− 1
2
(Kη˜tem − ηtem) Φ (te) = 0. (C.4)
9See Theorem 2.5 of Coddington & Carlson ([16]).
10See Theorem 2.8 of Coddington & Carlson ([16]).
11In fact, te is the unique root of detA in this case.
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Hence, by Lemma B.1,
d [detA (t)]
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
t=te
= −1
2
(Kη˜tem − ηtem)
[
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
]K−1
Φ˙ (t)
∣∣∣∣∣
t=te
> 0. (C.5)

C.2. Proof of Lemma 5.2. By (B.4), (C.5), and Lemma 5.1,
f (te) =
d [detA (t)]
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
t=te
= −1
2
(Kη˜tem − ηtem)
[
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (te)
]K−1
Φ˙ (te) . (C.6)
A short calculation shows that adj A (t) is given by
[adjA (t)]ik
=
(
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
)K−2

1− 1
2
[(K − 1) η˜tem − ηtem] Φ (t) if i = k
1
2
η˜temΦ (t) if i 6= k
. (C.7)
It follows that
[(adjA (t)]B (t)]ik
= η˜perΦ (t)
(
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
)K−1
+
(
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
)K−2(
ηperΦ (t) +
√
κ
ηtem
coth (τ (t))
)
·


1
2
[(K − 1) η˜tem − ηtem] Φ (t)− 1 if i = k
−1
2
η˜temΦ (t) if i 6= k
. (C.8)
One can then check that the only potentially non-zero eigenvalue of
D (te) =
[adjA (te)]B (te)
f (te)
is given by
λ = −
2
[
(Kη˜per − ηper)Φ (te)−
√
κ
ηtem
coth (τ (te))
]
(Kη˜tem − ηtem) Φ˙ (te)
(C.9)
with corresponding eigenvector vK as above. We get (5.3) from (C.9) after applying
(5.2).
Recall that Φ (te) > 0 and Φ˙ (te) < 0 by Lemma B.1. Since te, Φ, and τ do not depend
on η˜per or ηper , we can ensure that λ 6∈ Z by perturbing the latter parameters. D (te) is
then diagonalizable as observed in Proposition 4.1, and v1, . . . , vK−1 can be computed
using (C.8). 
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C.3. Proof of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2. Since our uncertain agents are semi-symmetric,
Ci (t, ω) = Φ (t) W˜t (ω)
+ Φ (t)
[
β˜t+
∑
k>K
η˜k,per
(
X
θ⋆k
k,t − xk
)
+
1
2
∑
k>K
η˜k,temθ
⋆
k,t
]
+Φ(t)

µiν2 + (S0 − Si,0)−
∑
k≤K
k 6=i
η˜perxk − xi (η˜per − ηper)

 (C.10)
for t ≤ te by Definition 4.1. For convenience, we introduce the following deterministic
function12 c and the constants c1, . . . , cK :
c (t) ,
[
β˜t+
∑
k>K
η˜k,per
(
X
θ⋆k
k,t − xk
)
+
1
2
∑
k>K
η˜k,temθ
⋆
k,t
]
K∑
i=1
civi ,


µ1
ν2
+ (S0 − S1,0)−
∑
k≤K
k 6=1
η˜perxk − x1 (η˜per − ηper)
...
µK
ν2
+ (S0 − SK,0)−
∑
k≤K
k 6=K
η˜perxk − xK (η˜per − ηper)


. (C.11)
Using (C.10), we get that
C (t, ω) = W˜t (ω)Φ (t) vK + c (t)Φ (t) vK +Φ(t)
K∑
i=1
civi. (C.12)
By (C.7), {v1, . . . , vK} is an eigenbasis for adj [A (t)]. Moreover,
(
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
)K−2 [
1− 1
2
(Kη˜tem − ηtem)Φ (t)
]
(C.13)
is the eigenvalue corresponding to each of v1, . . . , vK−1, while
(
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
)K−1
(C.14)
corresponds to vK .
12 The function c is deterministic by Corollary 3.1.
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By (B.9), it follows that
K∑
j=1
Fj (t, ω) vj
=
[P (t)]
−1
adj [A (t)]C (t, ω)
f (t)
= W˜t (ω)


Φ (t)
(
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
)K−1
f (t)

 [P (t)]−1 vK
+


Φ (t)
(
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
)K−1
(c (t) + cK)
f (t)

 [P (t)]−1 vK
+


Φ (t)
(
1 +
1
2
ηtemΦ (t)
)K−2 [
1− 1
2
(Kη˜tem − ηtem)Φ (t)
]
f (t)


·
K−1∑
i=1
ci [P (t)]
−1 vi. (C.15)
It follows that we can find analytic deterministic functions Fj,1 and Fj,2 such that
Fj (t, ω) , W˜t (ω)Fj,1 (t) + Fj,2 (t) (C.16)
for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.13 Since P (te) = IK (see Proposition 4.1), (C.6) and Remark
5.2 further imply that
Fj,1 (te) = Fj,2 (te) = · · · = FK−1,1 (te) = FK−1,2 (te) = 0 (C.17)
and
FK,1 (te) = −Φ
2 (te)
Φ˙ (te)
> 0 and FK,2 (te) = −Φ
2 (te)
Φ˙ (te)
(c (te) + cK) . (C.18)
While FK,1 (te) > 0, determining the sign of FK,2 (te) is difficult, in general, as it depends
upon the sign of c (te) + cK (see (C.11)).
We see from (C.16) and (C.17) that the expression
Fj (s, ω)
|s− te| (C.19)
is bounded near te for each j < K and almost every ω ∈ Ω˜. In particular, the coordinates
of both
K−1∑
j=1
(
yj (ω)−
∫ t
te−ρ
Fj (s, ω)
|s− te| ds
)
P (t) vj
and its time derivative are bounded near te for such ω as well.
Since P (te) = IK , the vK -coordinate of P (t) vK tends to 1 t ↑ te. For j < K, the
vj-coordinate of P (t) vK tends to 0 as t ↑ te. In each situation, we can also obtain
13 Note that c is continuously differentiable on [0, te] by Corollary 3.1.
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Lipschitz bounds on the convergence. Due to (4.4) and (C.16), potential explosions in
the coordinates of Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) are characterized by
lim
t↑te
[
|t− te|λ
(
yK (ω)−
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)FK,1 (s) + FK,2 (s)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
)]
. (C.20)
Specifically,
{|(C.20)| < +∞} ⇐⇒
{
lim
t↑te
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) exists in R
K
}
{(C.20) = +∞} ⇐⇒
{
lim
t↑te
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]⊤
}
{(C.20) = −∞} ⇐⇒
{
lim
t↑te
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) = [−∞, . . . ,−∞]⊤
}
. (C.21)
To finish the proof, we separately consider the λ < 0 and λ > 0 cases.
λ < 0 Case.
Assume that λ < 0. It follows that
lim
t↑te
∫ t
te−ρ
∣∣∣W˜s (ω)FK,1 (s)∣∣∣
|s− te|1+λ
ds <∞ and lim
t↑te
∫ t
te−ρ
|FK,2 (s)|
|s− te|1+λ
ds <∞.
Clearly,
lim
t↑te
|t− te|λ = +∞,
meaning that{
yK (ω)− lim
t↑te
∫ t
te−ρ
FK,2 (s)
|s− te|1+λ
ds > lim
t↑te
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)FK,1 (s)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
}
(C.22)
=⇒
{
lim
t↑te
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]⊤
}
and {
yK (ω)− lim
t↑te
∫ t
te−ρ
FK,2 (s)
|s− te|1+λ
ds < lim
t↑te
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)FK,1 (s)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
}
(C.23)
=⇒
{
lim
t↑te
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω) = [−∞, . . . ,−∞]⊤
}
Arguing as in our discussion of (C.19), we see that the hypotheses in (C.22) and (C.23)
also imply that{
lim
t↑te
θu,⋆t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]⊤
}
and
{
lim
t↑te
θu,⋆t (ω) = [−∞, . . . ,−∞]⊤
}
,
respectively.14 Conditional on F˜te−ρ, the RHS of the inequality in (C.22) (and C.23) is
deterministic. Since FK,1 (te) > 0 (see (C.18)), we finish our proof of Theorem 5.1.
λ > 0 Case.
Assume that λ > 0. We can find a constant R0 (ω) such that∣∣∣∣∣yK (ω)−
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)FK,1 (s) + FK,2 (s)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ R0 (ω)|t− te|λ . (C.24)
14 In particular, the coordinates of θu,⋆t (ω) will asymptotically explode at the rate |t− te|
−λ−1.
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Hence, (C.20) is bounded as t ↑ te and
lim
t↑te
Xu,θ
⋆
t (ω)
exists in RK by our previous comments.
By our discussion surrounding (C.19), we see that explosions in the coordinates of
θu,⋆t (ω) are characterized by
lim
t↑te
[
−λ |t− te|λ−1
(
yK (ω)−
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)FK,1 (s) + FK,2 (s)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
)
−
(
W˜t (ω)FK,1 (t) + FK,2 (t)
|t− te|
)]
. (C.25)
More precisely,
{(C.25) = +∞} ⇐⇒
{
lim
t↑te
θu,⋆t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]⊤
}
{(C.25) = −∞} ⇐⇒
{
lim
t↑te
θu,⋆t (ω) = [−∞, . . . ,−∞]⊤
}
. (C.26)
Suggestively, we first rewrite the expression in (C.25) as
FK,2 (t)
(
λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
1
|s− te|1+λ
ds− 1|t− te|
)
+ λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
FK,2 (s)− FK,2 (t)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
− λ |t− te|λ−1 yK (ω)
+ W˜t (ω)FK,1 (t)
(
λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
1
|s− te|1+λ
ds− 1|t− te|
)
+ λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω) [FK,1 (s)− FK,1 (t)]
|s− te|1+λ
ds
+ λ |t− te|λ−1 FK,1 (t)
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)− W˜t (ω)
|s− te|1+λ
ds (C.27)
Let R1 and R2 be the deterministic Lipschitz coefficients for FK,1 and FK,2. The first
two lines of (C.27) are deterministic, and we can obtain the following bounds:∣∣∣∣∣FK,2 (t)
(
λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
1
|s− te|1+λ
ds− 1|t− te|
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤ |FK,2 (t)| |t− te|
λ−1
ρλ∣∣∣∣∣λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
FK,2 (s)− FK,2 (t)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
λR2
1− λ
)(
ρ1−λ |t− te|λ−1 − 1
)
In (C.27), the third line is deterministic conditional on F˜te−ρ. Lines 4 - 6 of (C.27)
are stochastic conditional on F˜te−ρ. Letting R3 (ω) be the maximum of
∣∣∣W˜t (ω)∣∣∣ on
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[te − ρ, te], we notice that∣∣∣∣∣W˜t (ω)FK,1 (t)
(
λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
1
|s− te|1+λ
ds− 1|t− te|
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
FK,1 (t)
∣∣∣W˜t (ω)∣∣∣ |t− te|λ−1
ρλ∣∣∣∣∣λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω) [FK,1 (s)− FK,1 (t)]
|s− te|1+λ
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
λR1R3 (ω)
1− λ
)(
ρ1−λ |t− te|λ−1 − 1
)
.
When λ > 1, it follows that we see that (C.25) has the same behavior as
lim
t↑te
[
|t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)− W˜t (ω)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
]
(C.28)
(all other terms tend to 0 P˜ -a.s.). Using integration by parts,
|t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
W˜s (ω)− W˜t (ω)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
∼ N

0, |t− te|2λ−2
∫ t
te−ρ
(
|s− te|−λ
λ
− 1
λρλ
)2
ds

 . (C.29)
Asymptotically, the variance in (C.29) grows like |t− te|−1 as t ↑ te, completing the proof
of Theorem 5.2. 
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